Raja Kehri Singh and the forgotten front: Reassessing Bushahr’s role in the Tibet-Ladakh conflict

1. Introduction

Historically, the socio-cultural diversity of the Western Himalayas and the parallel Trans-Himalayan regions around Ladakh is portrayed by the fact that Central Asian Muslim hajis used to cross Ladakh on their way west to Mecca and Medina, whereas the Buddhists and Hindus pilgrims travelled east to the sacred Mount Kailash and Manasarovar Lake. In the course of the late medieval era, this contrast between the Cis and Trans Western Himalayan regions was patently highlighted during the Ladakh-Tibet conflict, which saw the participation of the Buddhist, Islamic and Hindu political powers.

Firstly, the Buddhist powers that formed the edifice of the conflict were, theocratic Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama and aided by the Mongols, pitted against monarchial Ladakh.3 Tibet then was led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, who was also the head of the Gelug sect (yellow hat sect) of Tibetan Buddhism and was also considered the living Boddhisattva Avalokiteshwar (Handa, 2014, p. 205). In contrast to Gelug sect dominated Tibet, in Ladakh, the Dragpa sect [i.e. red hat sect] was in prominence and received patronage for the lay monarch. Secondly, the Islamic belligerents in the conflict which aided Ladakh included the Mughal Empire, which, then, was ruled by the conservative Sunni monarch Aurangzeb and the Shia chief from Skardoo. Thirdly, as for the Hindu powers, participating in the war, they included the Western Himalayan principalities of Kullu and Rampur-Bushahr, led by Raja Bidhi Singh and Raja Kehri Singh, respectively, with the former being in the camp of the Mughals and the latter aided the Tibetans.

Even though, historically overlooked and little credited, Bushahr states under Raja Kehri Singh was sin qua non in destabilizing the short-lived dominance of Ladakh over modern day Western Tibet. In fact Bushahr played the decisive role in aiding and establishing a new and enduring status quo wherein, Tibet acted as the new hegemon. Further, Raja Kehri Singh not only successfully expanded his territory from Wangtu Bridge till Shipki La (Francke, 1914, p. 9) but also entered into a treaty with Tibet which laid the basis for a prosperous TransHimalayan trade wherein Rampur and Gartok4 served as the main trading centers.

2. Contested chronicles: divergent narratives of the conflict

The primary accounts for the reconstruction of an objective history of the Tibet-Ladakh conflict are quite limited. The accounts can be divided into four groups which are the Ladakhi, Tibetan, Mughal and Bushahri sources.

2.1 Ladakhi sources

- As for the Ladakhi narrative, the royal chronicles of Ladakh, i.e. La dvags rgyal rabs, only glance over the subject of conflict, most likely due to the fact that the war had embarrassed and denuded the royal prestige of Ladakh. However, casus belli for the conflict as per Ladakhi sources was the decision of the Namgyal monarch to side with his fellow Drugpa sect state of Bhutan in its conflict with Tibet (Jinpa, 2015, p. 113).

The first text of the modern era, which discussed the conflict, was ‘History of Western Tibet’ by A. H. Francke (Tobdan, 2008, p. 113)5 wherein, the relevant portion of the text contains merely paraphrasing of the Royal Chronicle of Ladakh. The work of Francke was devoid of reference to any other point of view and sources (Petech, 1947, p. 171). Nevertheless, the major contribution of the text was the fact that it introduced this war into the modern consciousness.

2.2 Tibetan sources

Among the Tibetan sources, the most exhaustive overview of the conflict is provided by the autobiography of the fifth Dalai Lama and by a 1698 work of his regent, Sanggye Gyatso. The Tibetan sources, in an attempt to justify and legitimise their wanton aggression, portray the Namgyal monarch of Ladakh as, among others, arrogant, greedy, evil, and even “enraged anti-Buddhist.” The Tibetan sources, in essence, press forth that the aggressive and anti-yellow hat, i.e. Gelugpa attitude of the Ladakhi monarch, fermented the conflict.

2.3 Mughal sources

The Mughal sources only cover the conflict incidentally and are limited to the later portion of the war which saw the involvement of the Mughal forces. Tarikh-i-Kashmir notes that the request of aid by the Gyalpo [King] of Ladakh was accepted by Emperor Aurangzeb while he was at Aurangabad in Deccan. Further, Tarikh-i-Kashmir states that in 1094 A.H., apart from the great flood, the other noteworthy event was the invasion of Ladakh, recorded as Great Tibet, by the Tibetans who were referred as Qalmaqs, i.e. Mongols. The text further states that the Mughal troops were called from as far as Kabul, and they were commanded by Fidai Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan, Subedar of Kashmir.

2.4 Sources from Bushahr

Unfortunately, during Goorkha’s occupation of Bushahr in early nineteenth century, the archives and records of the Bushahr were destroyed and historians have noted the “Gurkhas left behind nothing but rubble.” Nevertheless, the utter lack of historical material of Bushahr state was significantly addressed by the discovery of a document containing a treaty between Tibet and Bushahr found at Namgiya by the German Moravian missionary A. H. Francke in 1909. Francke found two versions of the treaty; it was likely rediscovered by Italian tibetologist Prof. Tucci in 1933 at Namgiya in Kinnaur. The document found by Prof. Tucci was identical to Francke’s copy, which augments its value as valid evidence. This sui generis source provides unique insights into the conflict and highlights the decisive role of Bushahri forces. British Foreign Department correspondences during the colonial period also emphasised tax-free trade between the two regions; this fact is supported by oral histories of Kinnaur.

3. An outline of the three states prior to the conflict

3.1 An overview of the Bushahr state and Raja Kehri Singh

Bushahr State was the largest state among the category of Simla Hill States recognised by the British after the Anglo-Gurkha War. Geographically the state was a part of the Sutlej catchment, and as determined by the British its area was 3,820 square kilometres (Weston, 1911, p. 4) and along with Bilaspur and Sirmaur, Bushahr was among the three paramount powers of Shimla Hill States (Mamgain, 1971, p. 57) but unlike Bilaspur and Sirmaur, Bushahr was placed right next to the Tibetan plateau. In essence geography mandated close relations between Bushahr and Trans-Himalayan catchment of Sutlej for e.g. the close socio-economic relationship between Ngari, Spiti, Upper Kinnaur and Bushahr was ensured by the fact that the antecedent river Sutlej provides a natural highway for traders, pilgrims, herders etc. to safely cross the Himalayas. Further, Rampur was the sole proximate town with a big market and access to goods and traders from the Indian plains. Rampur was also accessible from these regions even during the winters as no pass had to be crossed during the journey (Mamgain, 1971, p. 141)

The kings (Rajas) of Bushahr7 were considered to be semi-divine, and they were even worshipped by a significant section of their subjects and people from the Kinnaur region of the state believed that the Rajas of Bushahr, upon death, were reincarnated as the Dalai Lama (Weston, 1911, p. 6). There are different accounts as to the origin of the ruling family, and even the genealogy presented by historians like Francke and Tucci does not match (Petech, 1947, p. 176). The two genealogies of the royal family, one kept at Rampur and another at Kamru, are not consonant inter se, with the latter being longer than the former. Nevertheless, the popular belief was that the royal family of Bushahr descended from Praduman, the grandson of Lord Krishna (Buck, 1904, p. 247).

Historically it was Raja Chatar Singh, one hundred and tenth in line from Parduman (Weston, 1911, p. 5) who became the first ruler to exercise effective jurisdiction over the whole territory of Bushahr State including Kinnaur till Wangtu (Mamgain, 1971, p. 57) and even the neighbouring Thakurs were under his influence and necessary tribute was received (Weston, 1911, p. 7). Raja Kehri Singh, one hundred and thirteenth from Parduman (Weston, 1911, p. 6) was most likely the grandson of Raja Chatar Singh.

It is believed that Raja Kehri Singh was an ajanuyaku like Lord Ram and he once visited the darbar of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (Weston, 1911, p. 6). it is stated that the emperor upon witnessing a supernatural phenomenon was pleased to grant upon the Raja the title of Chattarpati along with a khillat. 8 The greatness of Kehri Singh may also be gauged by the fact that little information is available about the Rajas who followed him like Vijay Singh and Udai Singh (Mamgain, 1971, p. 59). When Raja Kehri Singh’s reign started, Ladakh was the paramount power of the region and controlled the areas of Ngari, Upper Kinnaur and Spiti. It was evident that for Bushahr to augment its territory in these regions, the contours of Ladakhi authority had to be denuded.

3.2 Kingdom of Ladakh and expansion under Gyalpo Senggee Namgyal

To appreciate the context of the Tibet-Ladakh war it is vital to understand the background within which Ladakh established its hegemony over large parts of the Western Trans-Himalaya. The kingdom of Ladakh was ruled by the Namgyal dynasty which had witnessed its high-water mark after the expansion made by Gyalpo Senggee Namgyal (Stobdan, 2019, p. 20).9 Senggee had augmented the status of Ladakh as the dominant power across the traditional threefold dominion (Ahmad, 1968, p. 340)10 that included, inter alia, Ladakh, Guge, Puhrang, Zanskar, Spiti,11 Lahaul and parts of Kinnaur. Sengge had, as a prince, captured Rudok in 1614 and Burang in 1615 (Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). Later, he conquered the capital, of Guge, Tsaparang, after surrender of Tashi Drakpa, and he placed his second son, Indrabodhi Namgyal, as the new monarch.

In 1638, Chokur, a descendant of Altan Khan, invaded Guge and Senggee Namgya not only defeated this Mongol force but also pursued it till Central Tibet, and most likely during this expedition, Sengge subdued the monastic fiefs and herding communities in Mustang and Droshod. (Jinpa, 2015, p. 125).Hence, the authority of Ladakh extended till Jumla, Dolpo and Mustang (Jinpa, 2015, p. 115) which lie beyond the Mayum La pass,12 and today form part of Nepal. Sengge also controlled Spiti (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 485), and his subordinate Gaga Chering Namgyal held the Dhankar fort (Francke, 1907, pp. 92, 101), which, upon his death, was passed on to Dechog Namgyal, who was the youngest son of Sengge Namgyal (Rizvi, 1983, p. 52).

In gravamen, Ladakhi hegemony was created upon the whole of Ngari, including the vital trading and the pilgrimage route to Kailasa and Mansarovar and Senggee eventually fixed Mayum La as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet (Petech, 1977, p. 171). Therefore, at the very least, the entire TransHimalayan catchment of Indus and Sutlej, except Balistan, was under the control of the Namgyal dynasty. Hence, Bushahr was now bordered by Ladakhi domains not only in the North towards Upper Kinnaur and Spiti but also in the east and resultantly the utility and prosperity of the vital trade route along the Sutlej and the pilgrimage of Bushahris to Manasarovar and Kailash were under the discretion of Leh. This period of expansion and wealth for Ladakh is also highlighted by the fact that Leh Palace was built before the iconic Potala Palace in Lhasa, by decades (Jinpa, 2015, p. 137).

After successfully concluding a campaign against the Mongols Sengge passed away at Hanle in 1642 (Petech, 1977, pp. 47–48; Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). Most likely, he was not older than forty (Rizvi, 1983, p. 52), though, just like the fifth Dalai Lama, his demise was kept as a secret for a few years (Karmay, 2014, p. 202). Sengge was a patron of the red hat sect and was naturally, not liked by the Tibetans, and they called him rdud-rgyal, i.e. the evil king of Ladakh (Stobdan, 2019, p. 21). The Tibetan sources even represented the Ladakhi Gyalpo as antiBuddhist. Subsequently, the Kingdom of Ladakh in an attempt to improve strained relations with Tibet sent two missions to Lhasa in 1664 and 1667 respectively, but both were devoid of any breakthrough and the Fifth Dalai Lama was quite upset with the missions (Ahmad, 1968, p. 344). Hence, the background ground for the conflict was laid by firstly, the significant conquests by Sengge Namgyal, secondly, by the desire of the yellow hat sect dominated Tibet to subdue the regions under influence of the red hat sect like Bhutan and Ladakh and lastly, there were economic and social factors discussed in the following section.

3.3 Consolidation of Tibet and rise of the yellow hat sect

After the fall of the Mongol, Yuan dynasty in China, it was the Mongol leader Gushri Khan who successfully militarily united the region, by conquering Eastern and Central Tibet.13 Though his armies were “known for their brutality towards soldiers and civilians alike” (Van Schaik, 2011, p. 147). Subsequently, Gushri Khan as the patron handed over the administration of Tibet to his priest i.e. the Fifth Dalai Lama. Hence, in practice, Tibet was governed by the Dalai Lama instead of lay governors. As for the sectarian divide the Italian missionary Jesuit Ippolito overview Desideri had noted the Gelugpas’ lingering “hate” and “persecution” of other sects of Tibetan Buddhism (Desideri, 1937, pp. 220–225). The religious convictions of the Gelugpa sect were made clear by the fact that if anyone failed to show respect for the Gelug teachings, the new ‘theocracy’ swore not to remain “without blood on [its] spears.” (Van Schaik, 2011, p. 149). For the Gelugpa sect, the Drukpa were nothing more than heretics and deceivers. After consolidating their power in Tibet the Gelugpa authorities at Lhasa were concerned with the fact that the frontier areas of the ethnographic Tibetan regions from Bhutan to Ladakh, like Mustang and Dolpo, were aligned with the Drukpa sect. In this regard Tibet had on at least seven occasions attacked Bhutan (Ardussi, 1999, pp. 65–66) and after the failure of these military expeditions, in 1679, a peace treaty was agreed between the two sides (Jinpa, 2015, p. 128). The Mongol troops, having learned the lesson, turned their attention towards the other major Drukpa power of Ladakh. The economic and social basis for the Tibetan invasion of Ladakh included among others, the control over lucrative shawl wool trade, the gold fields of Ngari and lastly, the prestige gained by the control over the holy sites around Mount Kailash. The production and export of pashmina shawls was vitalfor the economic well-being of the entire region from Ngari to Kashmir. Commercially, the most valuable activity for the region was sheep rearing, the resultant wool manufacturing and trade (Petech, 1947, p. 172). As for the gold fields of Ngari the Mughal prince Mirza Haidar Dughlat,14 who had invaded Ladakh and ventured into Guge, concluded that:

4. Tibet-Ladakh war and the role of Bushahr

4.1 The chronology and proceeding of the conflict

On July 7, 1679 the fifth Dalai Lama, ignoring the advice (Ahmad, 1968, p. 349) of his regent, ordered for a military expedition to Ladakh (Halkias, 2009, p. 63) under Galdan Boshugtu Khan (Tucci, 1947, p. 29).15 Galdan was not only a monk at the Tashilungpo monastery but also a Mongol prince (Halkias, 2009, p. 63) by descend as he was the grandson of the Mongol conqueror Gurshi Khan, who had aided the fifth Dalai Lama to gain temporal power. Further, Galdan was also the cousin of Dallas Khan (Petech, 1947, p. 174), who was the then protector King of Tibet. Additionally, it had been prophesied that the fifth Dalai Lama would one day subjugate Ladakh (Ahmad, 1999, pp. 236–239).

Galdan despite his martial lineage, before this military expedition, had only modicum of administrative experience that too, limited to maintaining order at the local market of Tashilungpo (Petech, 1947, p. 174). Further, Galdan, as per the Tibetan sources, was reluctant to take up the mantle for the expedition due to his pacifist faith, and only after significant hesitation, he accepted the duty bestowed by the Dalai Lama. Further, Galdan had also received encouraging omens from the Tibetan state oracle. The force for the conquest of Ladakh that departed from Lhasa, though, an elite contingent was merely two hundred and fifty troops strong (Petech, 1947, p. 175). The remaining Tibetan army was created from the Western regions based on the system of levies. The small initial force allowed for circumventing lengthy preparations or carrying huge logistics additionally the force also had the advantage of great mobility. Galdan proceeded via Mayum La to the border of Ladakh which was unguarded, and thereby he successfully reached Manasarovar without a fight. At the holy lake and Mountain, Galdan paid the traditional offering and performed a paridashina (Petech, 1947, p. 175).

Prof. Petech, noted that Ladakhi leadership had failed to gauge the gravity of the situation and, despite advice to the contrary, they went ahead with a pitched battle against the Tibetan-Mongol force (Petech, 1947, p. 177). The first battle was fought around the desert plains at the junction of the two sources of the Indus above Tashigang (Petech, 1947, p. 178), which resulted in a decisive Tibetan victory. Evidently, due to the superior quality of the Mongol stallions and their proficiency to perform complex cavalry maneuvers the Ladakhis were routed. Ideally the Ladakhis should have restrained themselves to their citadels. The cautious views were overlooked by most likely due to the prospect of capturing the Tibetan booty and as a result of underestimating the strength of their adversary

After the initial Tibetan victory further reinforcements were requested from Tibet due to the presence of Ladakhi garrisons in the region. These reinforcements numbered around five thousand soldiers (Petech, 1947, p. 179) andresultantly the Ladakhi garrison at Ngari surrendered as they were deterred from putting up resistance due to the sight of the large Tibetan reinforcements. Further, the strategic forts of Tashigang and Tsaparang were also taken over by the Tibetans. Thereby, the Ladakhi troops gave up their strongholds in Ngari without a long fight (Petech, 1947, p. 180) that would have tied down the Tibetans. Proceeding with the invasion, the Tibetan army in a surprise maneuver instead of following the course of Indus to enter Ladakh proper via Demchok instead moved to Ruthog and entered Ladakh along the Pangong Tso. The second battle of the war, in which the Ladakhi King personally participated, was fought below the Changla pass (Petech, 1947, p. 180). Yet again, the Tibetans defeated the Ladakhi army (Rizvi, 1983, p. 54), and the humiliated Gyalpo resultantly retreated to the Tingmosgang monastery. Subsequent to this victory, additional forces joined the Tibetans which likely included the natives from Guge or the Bushahri troops (Petech, 1947, p. 181). Later, Leh, the nerve centre of Ladakh fell without resistance and to symbolically signify that Ladakh had been humbled, the Tibetan General’s horse was tied to the lion gate of the Leh palace. The seemingly comprehensive conquest of Ladakh by the Tibetans was followed by the long siege of Bagso (Ahmad, 1968, p. 350). The fortifications at Basgo were nearly impregnable, and Bagso was believed to have perianal water supply (Rizvi, 1983, p. 54). During the siege, the Tibetan and the Bushahri troops were present at Goro or Daru (Petech, 1947, p. 182).

The long length of the siege provided the Gyalpo of Ladakh with the necessary time to employ diplomacy whereby he successfully negotiated to receive the essential succor from the Mughal Subhedar of Kashmir Ibrahmin Khan. As per some authors, historically the Mughals had enjoyed suzerainty over Ladakh (Petech, 1947, p. 183). The Mughal policy as to the Western Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan chiefs was to force them into the status of tributaries and never of outright conquest.16 The Mughals were interested in the developments in Ladakh due to, among others, the potential effect of Tibetan conquest on the lucrative wool trade. At the bare minimum the Mughals wanted to ensure that the trade route was not disturbed for long.

The Mughal forces entered Ladakhi territory through the famous Zoji La, and they were aided in their expedition by the ruler of Skardoo (Petech, 1947, p. 184) and Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu, 17 who, nonetheless, during the conflict, plundered Zanskar which was a principality of Ladakh. The Mughal participation immediately altered the status quo, the siege of Bagso was lifted, and a battle was fought near Bagso, at the plains of Chargyal, near Nimoo village, wherein the Tibetans-Mongol forces were decisively defeated. After their defeat, the Tibetan army retreated to Pangong Tso (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 486). The sequence of events is also corroborated by independent Mughal sources like Tarik-e-Kashmir and Maasir-i-Alangiri that state Mughal forces intervened in 1094 A.H., during Aurangzeb’s reign.

Nevertheless, the Mughals failed to exploit their clear military advantage to either entirely destroy the Tibetans force or conquer the recently lost Ngari. At the most decisive moment of the entire campaign Mughals returned to Kashmir and thereby ended any chance for Ladakh to reclaim its recently lost territories. Though, Ladakh proper was entirely freed from the invaders and recovered with the aid of Mughals. The Mughal sources claimed decisive victory and are entirely silent on the reasons for Mughal withdrawal, which seems quite improper and imprudent. On the other hand Tibetan sources, eulogising the Dalai Lama, pressed that in light of the magic and the special powers of the Dalai Lama, the Mughal soldiers panicked and left the campaign18 this explanation prima facie does not seems rational. Hence, a rational observer may venture to state that the Mughals, having succeeded in their primary objective i.e. to ensure independence and territorial integrity of Ladakh proper were satisfied and also being unaccustomed to the Trans-Himalayan winters, wanted to reach Kashmir before the snowfall could have blocked the notorious Zoji La and therefore, decided against proceeding to Ngari.19

The lack of documentary evidence that explained this juncture of the conflict was addressed by the finding of A. H. Francke and Prof. Tucci. The document exchanged between the Tibetan and Bushahri leadership highlights that the Mughals were bribed to withdraw by the Bushahri minister. Even though this premise for the Mughal withdrawal is based on a single document, the same was accepted by Prof. Petech as the factual position. This event may even be stated to be the most decisive aspect of the whole campaign, which had repercussions on the politics of the entire region for centuries to come.

Eventually, the war was concluded by the Treaty of Tingmosgang wherein, the Tibetans got significant territorial, religious and economic concessions from the Gyalpo of Ladakh. The entire duration of the Tibetan expedition is said to have been between the years 1679 and 1684, though Prof. Petech has provided an alternative and shorter timeline (Petech, 1947, p. 188). Lastly, the Tibetans, despite their victory, were alarmed by the request and resultant succor provided by the Islamic powers like Mughals to the Gyalpo of Ladakh. Tibetans must have been aware of the fact that the Gyalpo was even asked to convert to Islam in exchange for the Mughal aid. The Tibetans, therefore, emphasised in their agreement with Ladakh that the religious beliefs and practices of Buddhists and non-Buddhists were hostile to each other and the Gyalpo of Ladakh should not call upon foreign armies (Ahmad, 1999, p. 352). Yet, the responsibility of defending the boundary between Buddhist and non-Buddhist countries was solely entrusted to the monarch of Ladakh (Ahmad, 1999, p. 352).

4.2 Understanding the Tibet-Bushahr alliance against Ladakh

Most likely in 1679-1680, the Raja of Bushahr, Kehri Singh crossed the Shipki La, which later became the customary border between Tibet and Bushahr, to meet the Tibetan general. The monarch most likely proceeded via Tholing along the Sutlej valley to reach the region of Mount Kailash where he also made offerings at the holy Manasarovar Lake. The meeting between the two chiefs was likely made on the plains of Puling/Pulling Thang at Zhang-zhung, Guge as provided in the document of Namgiya (Petech, 1947, p. 176).

Prof. Petech has noted that Galdan:
“Upon his arrival in the Kailash Manasarovar region .... obtained, by a personal interview, the armed help of Raja Kehri Singh, in exchange for trade facilities” (Petech, 1977, p. 72).

The Basharhri Raja, apart from the unimpeded trade through the territories of Ngari, was also offered privilege of the biennial official delegation (Petech, 1977, p. 176). It seems that the forces from Bushahr joined their Tibetan- Mongol counterparts only the year after the meeting between the two leaders. It is likely that the Tibetan general only after winning the first battle of the war and having proved his worth met the Raja of Bushahr. During their meeting Raja Kehri Singh and Tibetan General Galdan negotiated and agreed to a treaty that was prepared in the name of ‘Buddha Shakyamanui’ to abide by the provisions therein, till perpetuity. The Treaty contained a small preamble/preface which highlighted the sanctity of the treaty, followed by four articles. Even though the treaty was concluded either in 1679 or 1680, it could have only taken effect in or after 1684. As it was only possible after the conflict, when Tibet acquired sovereignty and control over the region of Ngari, that the Tibetan authorities were in a position to fulfill their end of the obligation contained in the treaty, which included the assurance of safe trade and travel in Ngari as well as other services for the biennial delegation from Bushahr.

4.3 An analysis of the Tibet-Bushahr treaty of 1679

The document (Halkias, 2009, p. 82) found at Namgiya noted that during the reign of Raja Jodagpo (Halkias, 2009, p. 82) Guge had been conquered by the Gyalpo of Ladakh. Nevertheless, Galdan had received some prophesies (or revelation)(Halkias, 2009, p. 82) which assured him of his victory if he were to march on Ngari and Mayul (old name of Ladakh). The documents further noted that Raja Kehri Singh had called upon in aid the forces of 25 Rajas and 18 Thakurs or 21 Rajas and 18 Thakurai as per other translations but none of them responded undeterred, Raja Kehri Singh decided to proceed forth. The translation provided by Georgios T. Halkias notes that Raja Kehri Singh started his expedition on the pretext of taking a bath at Mansarovar (Halkias, 2009, p. 82). The document further provided that the Raja and Galdan had a meeting at Zhang-zhung in Guge.

The two leaders were respectively referred to, as the king of upper and lower (Halkias, 2009, p. 70), which most likely meant Tibet and Bushahr. The document furthermore acknowledged the joining of the two forces, i.e. of Tibet and Bushahr, against the Gyalpo of Ladakh. During the war it was wazir Chodas of Bushahr (Halkias, 2009, p. 83) who commanded the Bushahri army.

The document also acknowledged that Ladakh had called upon the Kashmiris and Baltis in aid, who were referred as Pathans. (Halkias, 2009, p. 71). It is also noteworthy that the preface of the treaty mentioned that the minister of Bushahr and the Tibetan officer named Don-agrub gave either fifteen loads of gold and silver or five bags (Halkias, 2009, p. 83) to the Kashmiris and Balti, i.e. the Mughals and their allies. In addition, the Mughals were also provided with the necessary provisions for their return (Halkias, 2009, p. 72) journey and thereby deserted by allies the Gyalpo of Ladakh was subjugated by Tibet and Bushahr.

Even though, the Tibet–Bushahr treaty of 1679 is not systematically divided into articles, as it followed a passage-like format; nevertheless, the following articles can be extracted.

The treaty opened with a preamble that delineated various symbols and events highlighting the sacrosanct nature of the treaty. After the preamble, the two sides solemnly agreed to respect each other’s boundary, i.e. territorial integrity.

• Article one provided – The leaders of Tibet and Bushahr, committed to the terms of the treaty, should dispatch messengers and envoys.
• Article two provided – Once every three years, Bushahr is required to send messengers to dwell in the four forts of Ngari, namely, Tsaprrang, Purang, Rutog and Gartok.
• Article three provided – That the subjects of the Tibetan and the Bushahri king, whenever visiting any part of each other’s territory, should not be subjected to the slightest measure of taxation, or anything of the sort.
• Article four provided – That the Tibetan and Bushahri king should not deviate from this agreement by ever using murderous weapons or poison cups.

The last article, in essence, meant that the two sides must continue their relations with good faith and their dealing should be bereft of any treachery.

In brief, the treaty provided in the first two articles for the maintenance of active diplomatic relations, and the engagement of envoys of Bushahr at, among others, Tsaparang and Rutog. Article three dealt with tax-free trade, and the last article reflected assurance of maintaining honesty in future transitions (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). It is interesting to note that Article Three fails to expand on the nature of trade, and there is no mention of wool or gold. Further, the incorporation of article three suggests that during the control of the Ngari by Ladakh, trade was either prohibited or discouraged through heavy taxation. Such economic policies, if followed, would have been beneficial for Ladakh as the Gyalpos of Ladakh would have prospered economically by the valuable trade of wool and gold flowing solely towards Ladakh proper. The Namgiya document ends by acknowledging that for thirteen generations Rajas of Bushahr have not violated the treaty. (Halkias, 2009, p. 83).

After the conclusion of the conflict, both the Ladakhi and Bushahri representatives agreed that Ngari was under the administration of Tibet (Halkias, 2009, p. 72). Further, Bushahr also gained the territories of Upper Kinnaur at the expense of Ladakh, though the same was not expressly provided in the treaty between Bushahr and Tibet, but this territorial shift from Ladakh to Bushahr must have happened after this conflict (Petech, 1947, p. 192). This new frontier between Bashahr with Tibet was so well known that there is a common saying in Tibet which states that Pimala Yanchhod Bod Gialbo, Pimala Ranchhod Khuna Gialbo—that translates to,

“The territory above Pimala [Shipki Pass] belongs to the Raja of Tibet and below to the Raja of Bashahr.” (Ministry of External Affairs, 1961, p. 168).

Resultantly, this war determined the modern boundary of India and Tibet, though no demarcation was undertaken. The only significant cross-border movement by military forces after this conflict was, firstly, the Dogra invasion led by Zorawar Singh in 1841, and later the Chinese invasion of India in 1962.

The oral traditions in Kinnaur to date acknowledge that the famous Lavi fair, held annually at Rampur, is based on the Tibet-Bushahr treaty (Halkias, 2009, p. 73). In essence, the treaty was the edifice of remunerative and prosperous Trans-Himalayan trade and resultantly Rampur developed as a viable trade center of the region (Moran, 2007, p. 173).

4.4 The decisive role of the Bushahri army

The alliance with Bushahr must have provided the Tibetans not only with additional and fresh manpower and resources but also vital intelligence and knowledge of the local terrain. As aforementioned, the army from Rampur, which invaded Ladakh along with the Tibetan Army (Mamgain, 1971, p. 58), was commanded by the Wazir Chhodas. The army, likely, joined the Tibetan army at Go-ro in Ladakh before the second battle of the war at Chang La/Byan La. The delay in the joining of the two forces was because the meeting and agreement between Raja Kehri Singh and the Tibetan General happened sufficiently late in the year that no time was left for the Bushahri troops to assemble and reach Ngari (Petech, 1947, p. 176) before the passes were closed by snow or were dangerous to cross.

The sources highlight that forces of Bushahr were present at the siege of Bagso and most likely participated in the subsequent conflict against the Mughals. Nevertheless, the critical role played by the Bushahri wazir during the campaign was not on the battlefield but it was instead his ability to successfully convince the Pathans, to withdraw from Ladakh after the battle of Bagso. In effect by the bribe Wazir Chhodas had bought over the Pathans, and it was essentially due to the desertion of the Pathans that Ladakh was eventually defeated (Mamgain, 1971, p. 58). The bribery of the Mughals very well explains their subsequent conduct and failure to advance and destroy the Tibetan army or force them into a long retreat. Even as per Prof. Petech, the Mughals led by Fidai Khan failed to press forth, their momentum, because of the lucrative bribe offered by the Bushahri Wazir (Petech, 1947, p. 186) and a Tibetan officer by the name of Don Grub/Nawang Donbub (Halkias, 2009, p. 83). Quite unsurprisingly, the Mughal sources are silent on the aspect of bribery, though the capture of booty was mentioned by them.

4.5 Potential causes for the failure of the Himalayan chiefs to aid Bushahr

To understand the failure of the local chiefs to aid Raja Kehri Singh, one needs to analyse the political situation of that era. Immediately preceding the Ladakh- Tibet war the local expansionist endeavours of Kehri Singh had resulted in Bushahr occupying certain regions of the Sutlej valley belonging to the Kullu state. Raja of Kullu, therefore, appealed to Raja Bhim Chand of Bilaspur, who, aided by Raja Sidh Sen of Mandi, moved with a huge army towards Rampur (Tobdan, 2008, p. 111). Raja Bhim Chand conquered the village of Duttnagar along the Sutlej and thereafter, proceeded to Nirmand (Ganesh, 1882, pp. 61–62). Resultantly, the territories conquered by Rampur were restored to Kullu, as per account by Kavi Ganesh (Tobdan, 2008, p. 111). Further, in the same period the kingdom of Bilaspur had emerged as the overlord of the Bharah Thakurains (Chandel, 2007, p. 58) of the Shimla region and hence it is not tough to understand why support was not forthcoming.

Further, due to the lack of unified command and in the absence of any prospects for territorial gains for other states, any expedition into the harsh Trans- Himalayan regions would have been quite low on the list of priorities for the Himalayan chiefs. Meanwhile, Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu, who was one of the Rajas to be called upon, by Bushahr had sided with the Mughals and for his services he was granted control over Lahaul (Handa, 2001, p. 206). In gravamen, the states did not functioned as a unified group; rather, more often than not, their interests were mutually conflicting, thereby, instead of undertaking a tough expedition against Ladakh, they were more focused on pulling their neighbours down.

5. Aftermath of the Tibet-Ladakh war

Galdan, after his victory, was received and greeted at Tashilungpo by the Tashi Lama. The Tibetan/Mongol army received a hero’s welcome. The clear loser of the conflict was the Kingdom of Ladakh, which ended up paying to all the participants of the conflict. Further, the Mughal suzerainty over Ladakh was reaffirmed. The Gyalpo in return for Mughal aid had to convert to Islam and he took the name Aqabat Mahmud Khan (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). Additionally, the King even had to leave his son at the Mughal court to be brought up as a Muslim (Halkias, 2009, p. 66). However, the Gyalpo quickly reverted to Buddhism, and his apostasy was conveniently overlooked by Delhi. Naturally, the Chronicles of Ladakh are silent on the issue of conversion (Rizvi, 1998, p. 55).

Territorially, Ladakh had to concede its authority not only to its adversaries but also to its allies! The Mughals took over the village of Nabsat from Ladakh. The Mughal ally Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu was granted Upper Lahaul for his aid. During the conflict Raja Bidhi Singh had invaded Lahaul and expelled Ladakhi influence from the valley (Diack, 1897, p. 37). Further, some parts of Baltistan, which had been taken over by Ladakh, were granted back to the chief of Skardoo.

As for the adversaries in 1684 the Treaty of Tingmosgang was signed between Tibet and Ladakh wherein inter alia the frontier between the two powers was decided, though not delineated. Ladakh lost the entire region between Mayum La and Demchok, though it retained the small enclave at Mensar i.e. Guge, which was re-conquered by Sengge Namgyal was lost forever (Rizvi, 1998, p. 55). Further, the Gyalpo of Ladakh had to send triennial presents to Lhasa (Shakabpa, 1967, p. 123), though tribute was also paid to the governors of Kashmir (India, Quarter Master General’s Department, Intelligence Branch, 1974, p. 536).

It seems a modicum of ceremonial respect was retained by Lhasa over Ladakh as tribute/presents were paid/sent to the authorities at Gartok till 1842 (Petech, 1947, p. 191) when Dogra conquered Ladakh. As for the military situation the Tibetans consolidated themselves in Ngari and in 1715, the Italian Jesuit missionary Desideri found the region of Guge was “garrisoned by a strong body of Tartar [i.e. Mongol] and Tibetan troops” headed by “a Tartar Prince” (Desideri, 1937, p. 82). Further, Tibetans also made necessary administrative changes in the region and Tibetan governors i.e. garpon along with administrators, were sent to Guge, Puhrang and Spiti (Ahmad, 1968, pp. 348–349). As for the theological changes, the first Tibetan abbot of Tholing monastery reached Tholing two years after the Tibetan victory (Vitali, 1999, p. 49). The sectarian changes introduced after the conflict are still visible in modern-day Himachal as the stark contrast between Drukpa-aligned Lahaul and Gelugpa-dominated Spiti across Kunzum La highlights the religious implications of this political conflict.

6. An analysis of popular historical narrative

As per popular historical narrative Raja Kehri Singh defeated the Tibetan Commander Galden in a battle and a treaty was signed wherein it was provided that “Kailash will remain the boundary line between Kinnaur and Tibet”. Further, this view that Kailash was declared as the boundary between Bushahr and Tibet is also incorporated in the Himachal Pradesh District Gazetteers for Kinnaur (Mamgain, 1971, p. 59). This account does not seem reasonable for a plethora of reasons which include firstly, the non-alignment of their narrative with the primary historical sources which include Tibetan, Ladakhi, Mughal sources and the treaty found by Francke and Prof. Tucci, secondly, it seems unlikely that, even in case of the Bushahri victory over Tibet in a hypothetical battle, the boundary would have been pushed till Kailash as the same was clearly beyond the material and manpower capacity of the Bushahri state and thirdly, this view fails to explain what the Ladakhi were doing during this conflict as Guge and Kailash were under their control since the expansion done by Senggee Namgyal.

The second anomaly regarding the conflict is found in the works of Vogel and Hutchison wherein, it is provided that the conditions created by the invasion of Ladakh by the forces from Eastern Tibet in AD 1646-47 (Wessels, 1924, pp. 75– 76), aided Kullu Raja to expand into Lahaul at the expense of Ladakh (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 110). The date accorded to this conquest is off by a few decades, as it was only in 1679 that the invasion of Ladakh happened. Thirdly, another view as to the alliance between Bushahr and Tibet was provided by S. R. Johri (Johri, 1964, pp. 24–26), who noted that Mughal Mirza Haider had invaded Ladakh in 1523 and Tibet to maintain peace along the Indo-Tibet frontier concluded a treaty of friendship with the monarch of Rampur. This view must also be overlooked after the scrutiny of the contemporary historical evidence as it is well established that Mirza Haider was the cousin of Emperor Babur whereas the Tibet-Ladakh war occurred during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Lastly, the popular narrative, which states that no Indian army had marched across western Tibet, i.e. Ngari before the Sikh-Dogra forces of Maharaja Sher Singh and Raja Gulab Singh under Wazir Zorawar Singh invaded Tibet, seems to be an overstatement as the forces of Bushahr had achieved the feat over a century and half prior i.e. undertaking a Trans-Himalayan expedition in modern day western Tibet. Bushahris unlike Zorawar Singh who fought with the Tibetans and Qing forces with an army composed of, among others, the prince of Ladakh, Kehri Singh’s forces fought against Ladakh in aid of Tibet.

7. Revised history of Bushahr state after Kehri Singh

The advantages for Bushahr of the Tibetan victory included inter alia, a prosperous Trans-Himalayan trade and dominance over Upper Kinnaur due to the withdrawal of Ladakh, it is purported that Raja Kehri Singh received Hangrang valley, situated along Spiti River, as a jagir. Further, the relations with Tibet also stood on a positive ground, thereby relieving the Bushahri army from the pressure to defend the Northern and Eastern frontiers of the state. In addition, as per Mr. Gerard in 1776 A.D., the fort of Dankhar was held by Bushahri forces for two years (Hutchison & Vogel, 1933, p. 487). As for Tibet, the tax-free trade between the two sides continued till the 1962 war.

In 1909 when A. H. Francke visited Rampur, Raja Shamsher Singh of Bushahr showed him a fresco which was purported to be a copy of the painting at the palace of Lhasa. Francke noted in this reference that:
“The fresco evidently represents the treaty between Tibet and Bashahr concluded about 1650 A.D., when Bashahr was supported by the Mughal Emperor....... The Tibetans who had been beaten by the Mughal army at Basgo, near Leh, had to cede a portion of Guge, viz, the Satluj valley down to the Wangtu bridge, to Bashahr State.”

It is quite clear that the fresco at the palace of the Bushahri Raja was based on the wrong view of history wherein, the characters and events described as part of the war did occur but the narrative was thoroughly distorted. This mistake can only be explained by the destruction of the royal record of the state during the Gurkha conquest where after most likely history had to be reconstructed based on memory. Further, close relation between Kehri Singh and the Mughals especially in the context of the grant of title of chattarpati might have induced the narrative that Bushahr had supported Mughals against the Tibetans. The narrative provided in the District Gazetteer and part of the popular history most certainly was borrowed from this paradigm.

Conclusion

The Tibet-Ladakh war ended the short-lived Namgyal expansion, with Ladakh losing Ngari, parts of Baltistan, Upper Lahaul, Nabsat, and its frontier pushed back to Demchok; it lost roughly half its territory. The 1684 boundary largely defines the modern India–Tibet frontier. The Mughals acted to protect trade and regional interests; Tibet was primarily driven by sectarian aims. Ladakh’s imperial overreach created many enemies. Bushahr played a decisive role: the wazir’s maneuver to induce Mughal withdrawal proved pivotal; the Kehri Singh–Galdan treaty established diplomatic relations and tax-free trade that fueled fairs at Gartok and Rampur and cemented Rampur’s commercial prominence. Bushahr removed Ladakhi influence from Upper Kinnaur and likely received Hangrang. Popular narratives overstating Kailash boundary and uniqueness of later trans-Tibet expeditions do not withstand scrutiny. The episode underscores that imperial control over Himalayan principalities was limited and that regional states often acted in self-interest on opposing sides of larger conflicts.

Notes

1. Hindu Gosains and Bhotiyas acted as trading pilgrims; written trade contact was called Gamgya.
2. Mount Kailash is sacred to Buddhists, Hindus, Jains and Bon.
3. ‘La’ ‘dak’ means “land of high passes.”
4. British later established a trading agency at Gartok.
5. Francke, a German Tibetologist and missionary, discovered the Namgiya document in 1909.
6. The original treaty might have been engraved on copper, destroyed during the Goorkha expedition.
7. Raja Ram Singh later selected Rampur as capital.
8. Khillat: robes of honor granted in Mughal ceremonies.
9. Senggee Namgyal (Lion King) was son of Jamyang Namgyal and Gyal Khatun.
10. Ngari Korsum division and Yarlung descent of rulers.
11. Renovation of Tabo monastery and Drukpa alignment.
12. Mayum La at watershed of Sutlej and Brahmaputra; Zhangzhung culture region.
13. Tsang Desi executed in 1642; end of lay Tibetan royal rule.
14. Mirza Haider, cousin of Babur, invaded Ladakh in 1532.
15. Galdan’s tomb believed at Taklakot in Ngari.
16. Mughal preference for tributary status rather than conquest.
17. Raja Bidhi Singh of Kullu aided Mughals; gained Lahaul.
18. Tibetan sources often attributed reversals to spiritual causes.
19. Puling Thang near Tsaparang along old trade route.
20. Alternate reading conflating Nawang Donbud with Bushahri wazir.
21. Boundary as a social transition zone noted by Francke.
22. Lavi fair derives from the Tibet–Bushahr treaty.
23. Gartok–Rampur wool trade routes diversified despite Tingmosgang terms.
24. Bhim Chand of Bilaspur’s overlordship among Bharah Thakurains.
25. Tribute network details.
26. Trifling presents sent to Garoo every three years.
27. Skirmishes between Ladakh and Guge prior to 1620.
28. Wazir Zorawar Singh’s 1841 expedition to western Tibet.